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Chapter I:  Introduction
In this era of globalization, it is increasingly evident that events in one part of the 
world, have repercussions throughout the global community. Be it a natural disaster in 
Asia, or an economic crisis in South America, the interconnectedness of events in today’s 
world makes once regional problems into issues of international importance.  Nowhere is 
this more pronounced than in matters of international public health.  Recent epidemics 
such as SARS, drug-resistant TB, and AIDS have startled the international community into 
acknowledging how far reaching “local” health problems can be.  In each of these cases, 
however, international notoriety was only achieved once the diseases began spreading to 
western nations. Despite all the recent advances in international cooperation and global 
conscientiousness, it seems that global health organizations focus mainly on those interna-
tional health problems that affect first world nations.
The incomplete mission of global malaria containment is a clear example of how an 
“international” health problem was abandoned once eradication was achieved in first world 
nations.  Malaria was considered the most pressing health problem in the United States 
well into the 20th century. However, the disease slowly faded into obscurity during the 
mid-century with the success of the American eradication campaign.  Despite this lim-
ited containment, the powerful effects of malaria are still felt across the globe today.  In 
Africa, it was the number one cause of deaths until it took second place to AIDs in 
1999, and today one in twenty children worldwide, die ever year of malaria related 
causes (Rosenberg, 2001).   The costs of malaria include decreased productivity in 
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adults, decreased birthrates, unemployment, regional economic depression, develop-
mental disorders in children, stunted growth in children, and decreased education due 
to absenteeism (Economic Commission for Africa [ECA], 2004).  Yet, despite the se-
verity of its effects, the virulent nature of this epidemic remains conspicuously absent 
from the public eye.  
Historians and scientists alike have many theories as to why malaria was suc-
cessfully contained in the first world, but remained mostly unchecked in the developing 
world.  Some blame the residual attitudes and policies of the colonial era.  Others be-
lieve over-dependence on technology, in particular DDT, led to an unsustainable under-
taking in malaria eradication.  Still others blame World War II and the ensuing Cold 
War for re-establishing a harmful 1st world – 3rd world order instead of a comprehen-
sive initiative for universal global health.  Others claim that because international or-
ganizations and their finances are controlled by first world nations, the focus has 
shifted away from prevention toward crisis control and spot solutions.  The reality is 
that all of these factors have contributed to the existing state of global health initiatives. 
While many analysts have places unilateral blame on a single factor in the history 
of international public health, few have analyzed the interplay of factors and their implica-
tions for current policies.  We must further explore the history of the development of epi-
demics as well as the history of their containment.  In doing so we will better understand 
both the challenges facing developing nations today and the pitfalls/benefits of potential 
solutions.   By learning from past mistakes and successes, there can be hope for the mil-
lions dying from preventable disease throughout the world.  This paper will approach suc-
2
cessful containment of current malarial epidemics by analyzing: past instigating factors of 
malaria epidemics, the contributing reasons for past successful and failed eradication cam-
paigns, and a comparison of potential policy changes for the future. 
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Chapter II :  The Colonial Era
While Malaria epidemics have been recorded since the time of the ancient 
Greeks,  the modern malarial plague came to full force during the mid to late British 
colonial era (Williams, 1969; Humphreys, 2001; Harrison, 1978).  As such, the plague 
reached such proportions that scientific study of the disease and potential cures gained 
paramount importance to the British colonial administration where it was labeled the 
world’s largest health problem.  Discoveries pertaining to the parasite, even earned 
several Nobel Prizes during the late 1800’s.  The international nature of the epidemic 
also encouraged public health cooperation between many nations for the first time. De-
spite the significance that the malaria epidemic held in the minds of so many, colonial 
administrators and military officials were often resistant to scientific discoveries about 
the spread of malaria.  Instead, they preferred to cling to prejudiced ideas, blaming 
“uncivilized” native populations for the introduction and spread of the disease.  It is a 
sad irony that the actions of colonial powers at home and abroad did far more to insti-
gate the spread of malaria, by shifting ecological, sociological and demographic bal-
ances that had previously existed in colonial nations. 
2.1 Colonial Study of the Etiology of Malaria
Malaria is a disease that relies on several organisms to survive (Basch, 1990; 
Kiple, 1993; Williams, 1969).  In fact its life cycle is so seemingly fragile that one 
wonders how it wreaks the havoc it does.  The disease itself is caused by a plasmodium 
that requires first a mosquito and then a mammalian host.  To spread the disease, a 
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night-feeding, female mosquito must bite an infected animal, allow enough time for the 
plasmodium to gestate inside her, and then must bite other uninfected animals before 
her  short life-span ends, passing on the vector.  Only one species of mosquito can act 
as a carrier, the anopheles, and even then, only the female of that species can do so.  As 
mosquitoes have a maximum life-span of a few weeks, this life cycle seems fragile at 
best.  However, with a large enough infected population the disease can spread vora-
ciously.  These complex elements of malarial infections took decades to be discovered 
and proven, and even longer to be widely accepted as truth.
The etiology of malaria was discovered in stages over a period of several dec-
ades running from the late 1800s to the mid-twentieth century (Harrison, 1978; Wil-
liams, 1969; Humphreys, 1996). A French army surgeon named, Charles Laveran first 
noticed the parasite in a sample of infected blood in 1880.  At the time, he was met 
with wide scale skepticism in the scientific community, but twenty-seven years later he 
was honored with a Nobel Prize for his discovery.  In 1886, Camillio Golgi, a famous 
Italian physician who also won the Nobel Prize for his many important microbiological 
discoveries, confirmed that the parasite existed.  Furthermore, he studied the life cycle 
of the parasite and correlated stages of parasitic replication to cycles of malarial symp-
toms in the patient.  Despite this knowledge, however, no advances in malarial treat-
ments could be made until scientists found out how the parasite entered their hosts.
British physician Patrick “Mosquito” Mason discovered the anopheles vector, in 
1895, when he discovered the plasmodia in the stomachs of dissected mosquitoes (Har-
rison, 1978; Williams, 1969; Humphreys, 1996). Despite the mockery of the British 
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science community, he postulated that mosquitoes were an immutable link in the life-
cycle cycle of the malarial parasite. He sought the help of an army surgeon named 
Ronald Ross to confirm this theory. Over the next three years Ross studied mosquitoes 
at his post in India, to find that the plasmodium indeed could not survive without a 
mosquito intermediary.  By 1898, Ross filled in the final stages of the plasmodium’s 
life cycle with his discovery that spores, which grow in the mosquito, later infect hu-
mans though the mosquito’s saliva.  Ross went on to campaign against malaria with 
further studies on the plasmodium and on vector control methods. He also received a 
Nobel Prize for his work, and Patrick Mason was knighted for his discovery.
2.2 Colonial Causes of the Plague
The governmental support of research into the etiology of malaria was mostly 
spurred by the devastating impact that the disease had on colonial empires.  Britain es-
pecially suffered at the hands of the tiny plasmodia, who did not discriminate between 
colonial administrators, military officials or natives as they swept through colonial set-
tlements. Yet few researchers examined how the actions of colonial administrations in-
stigated and exacerbated these very epidemics.  Through a callus disruption of the deli-
cate demographic, economic, socio-cultural and ecological balances that native cultures 
had developed over centuries, colonial powers unleashed a virulent epidemic, which 
remains unchecked in many of those communities to this day.  In addition military and 
civil leaders in colonial areas clung to bigoted, prejudiced views on controlling and 
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preventing malaria instead of embracing new scientific reasoning.  These colonial fail-
ings both caused and prolonged malarial epidemics in the region. 
The arrival of colonial powers portended drastic changes in local demographics.  
In tropical colonies such as those in the Pacific Rim, Caribbean, and the Asian sub-
continent, colonists established extensive plantations, mines, and estates to maximize 
production of local goods for export.  In order to do this, colonial powers seized all lo-
cal land and distributed it in large tracts to wealthy landowners.  This process is re-
ferred to as caciquism (DeBevois, 1995). As a result, native populations were forced off 
their ancestral land, and onto less desirable terrain.  The effects of this kind of shift 
were especially pronounced in the case of the Philippines, where natives were forced to 
move into the hitherto avoided lowlands.  These wet jungles had long been avoided for 
their “fevers.”  The thick brush and moist environment made it a thriving breeding 
ground for the anopheles mosquito and therein malaria.  Once the colonists forced these 
lands to become home to the displaced native population, malaria epidemics began 
sweeping their plantations and military camps (Anderson, 2006). Also, with their pri-
vate tracts seized, the local population had no other viable employment aside from co-
lonial enterprises.  Out of necessity, many locals worked several jobs during harvest 
season, sometimes in different regions.  As a result, there was far more population 
movement than ever before, which further increased the transmission of malaria from 
region to region (DeBevois, 1995). In regions such as India, malaria affected popula-
tions even further by preventing women from carrying babies to term.  As a result, on 
some estates no children were born for years on end despite there being incentives and 
7
special treatment offered for expecting mothers (Williams, 1969). These kinds of 
demographic shifts had the devastating effect of starting and spreading malaria epidem-
ics in regions that had never faced such plagues before.
Colonial mismanagement and exploitation also led to major shifts in economic 
factors (Williams, 1969; Packard, 1997).  Of these, two effects are most pronounced: a 
policy of viewing workers in terms of economic value and the narrowing of economic 
possibilities within pre-existing social classes.  The first of these ultimately decreased 
the value of human life in a way that has never been fully changed even in post-
colonial times. With the vast economic benefits available to them through their new 
colonies, colonial powers focused primarily on maximum profits. At the time, it was 
more profitable to simply hire new workers than to provide care and benefits for the 
existing workers.  This view of workers as expendable factors of production did not 
change until the World Wars highlighted the growing scarcity of workers and need for 
new consumption markets. As malaria epidemics spread, colonial powers realized that 
to provide for their own health, some preventative measures had to be taken.  In his 
analysis of post-war public health initiatives Randall Packard quotes one 1948 health 
official as stating, “Africa cannot be fully exploited because of flies and mosquitoes; if 
we can control them the prosperity of Europe will be enhanced” (Packard, 1997, p. 96).  
Attitudes such as this kept the focus on third world health in terms of first world bene-
fits.  In this way, the unhealthy viewpoint started by colonial powers continued to crip-
ple developing regions as health services remained concentrated in industrial areas and 
socio-economic infrastructure was ignored.
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Figure 2.1 “From Cairo to Capetown”  1892 political cartoon in Punch magazine, 
depicting Cecil Rhodes spanning Africa
 Colonial enterprises exploited local populations for hard labor and often began 
near-feudal societies where social mobility was impossible.  Ineffective anti-malarial 
strategies strengthened these trends creating an inescapable class structure (Williams, 
1969; Anderson, 2006).  Malaria contributed to this by decreasing a worker’s produc-
tivity and therein preventing a build up of capital. For many tenant farmers inescapable 
debt could also be attributed to malaria.  The parasite killed or weakened livestock 
while doing the same to the farmers.  This combination drastically decreased productiv-
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ity and caused infected farmers to become entrenched in debt while remaining unable 
to harvest their crops. Colonial estate workers saw a similar fate. For example, in India, 
working at a colonial estate was known to have high fatality rates due to untreated ma-
laria.  However, because natives had few alternative choices of employment they were 
forced to accept these risks in order to support their families.  On select estates estate 
owners established their own anti-malaria strategies including administering bed nets, 
draining standing water, and providing screened housing.  On these estates, laborers 
could work with the knowledge that they had a higher chance of returning home 
healthy.  As a result they could return for many seasons and work their way to a higher 
standard of living.  Without malaria control, however workers were doomed to life as 
an expendable factor of production with little chance for survival. 
 The plight of the malaria-infected tenant farmer or estate worker is as much a 
product of colonial ecological manipulation as it is a product of colonial economic sys-
tems.  The introduction of new diseases along with drastic changes in farming tech-
niques, irrigation, pesticides, and large-scale agricultural enterprises all changed the 
preexisting ecological balance, therein contributing to the expanding malaria epidemic. 
Colonial expansion introduced many new diseases to their colonies (DeBevois, 
1995; Mitchell, 2002).  For example, colonies like Egypt had been untouched by ma-
laria until colonial times.  It is thought that the parasite was transported there by air 
land and/or boat with the increase in colonial traffic. Further disrupting the colonial 
ecosystems was the introduction of the rinderpest virus which heightened the severity 
of malaria epidemics in Egypt, the Philippines, and other colonies.  This virus mainly 
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killed livestock, which had two main affects on malaria. First with dying livestock, 
mosquitoes had fewer non-human alternatives for blood meals. Second, with no live-
stock, farmers were forced to plow and harvest crops with no animal power.  This 
weakened the farmers who were already at a higher risk of malaria infection, because 
the mosquitoes had been forced to seek human blood meals.  In turn, weakened farmers 
were more susceptible to malaria attacks. At the end of this harsh cycle, many fields lay  
fallow as farmers fell to the epidemic.  Soon these fields turned to brush, which pro-
vided even more breeding grounds for malaria carrying mosquitoes. Thus, the malarial 
cycle was perpetuated, sometimes never regaining an ecological balance.
Colonial powers also shifted local ecosystems by drastically changing farming 
methods (Mitchell, 2002).  For example in the Gambia, Senegal and Egypt, vast new 
irrigation systems and flood-preventing dams created unprecedented standing water 
near native populations. In addition natives soon became dependent on western intro-
duced chemical fertilizers.  As a result, these nations experienced a desperate famine 
when fertilizer supplies were cut off during the World Wars (see Ch. III).  In addition, 
new standing water, concentrated worker settlements, and the introduction of malaria 
combined to further cripple native farmers, as malaria epidemics began spreading in 
starving communities.  Weakened by malaria and lacking colonial agricultural supplies, 
these African nations went into a downward spiral of famine.  Ironically, many of the 
colonial agricultural enterprises still produced some surplus during this time, though 
natives gained no relief at all. 
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 While these cases exemplify the dangers of “progressive” colonial influences, 
backward colonial influences were equally detrimental (Anderson, 2006; Williams, 
1969; DeBevois, 1995).  Colonial powers brought with them racist ideologies and often 
resisted scientific discoveries that countered such ideas. For example, the racial preju-
dices of colonial military officers often motivated their public health solutions more 
than scientific facts did.  In one case colonial officials in the Philippines forced natives 
to move both farms and settlements away from military camps in the highlands claim-
ing that “the greatest danger to the white man lies with the native” (Anderson, 2006, p. 
208).  This forced people into mosquito infested lowlands and crippled the local agri-
cultural economy.  This all occurred long after the mosquito was discovered as a para-
site carrier.  However, when malaria persisted, colonists still blamed the epidemics on a 
lack of hygiene, and claimed that “civilization and cleanliness” would cure the “pro-
miscuous defecators” (Anderson, 2006, p. 207). This kind of colonial view of native 
inferiority reflected an oversimplified view of public health solutions and created an 
unsubstantiated connection between morality and poor health. By clinging to racial rea-
soning and refusing to acknowledge alternative causes, the colonial administration lost 
valuable ground in stemming the malaria epidemic. 
Racial thinking has been prevalent in many malaria-ridden parts of the world.  
For example, one cannot separate colonial hindrances to malaria containment from 
similar issues within the American South (Anderson, 2006; Humphreys, 2001; Harri-
son, 1978).  The fact that 70% of this virulent epidemic existed on plantations is indica-
tive of its inherent connections to race and economic inequality (Anderson, 2006, 
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p.216).  The major differences lie within the government’s response to malarial epi-
demics on a bureaucratic level.  While racism in the American south persisted on a lo-
cal level, on an official level, the American government embraced new discoveries 
about parasitic epidemics and focused on the cutting edge ecological solutions to the 
problem.  In contrast, the Colonial British government clung to racial solutions such as 
hygiene education and the sequestering of natives from foreign occupiers, while resist-
ing new techniques and breakthroughs. These differences in governmental approach 
have had many persisting repercussions in the fate of the regions under their control. 
For example, the Americans implemented effective drainage and pesticide campaigns, 
which eventually led to vastly improved local health and epidemic containment.
In hindsight, it is easy to unilaterally blame colonial powers for all subsequent 
ails in their colonies.  The reality is rarely so clear-cut.  Exploitative and mismanaged 
colonization certainly played a large part in the spread of malaria epidemics, however, 
it is not alone in producing wide disparities in the implementation of epidemic controls. 
Nonetheless, the residual social structures, economic inequalities, ecological misman-
agement and demographic shifts started by colonialism have had lasting effects. 
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Chapter III:  The Rockefeller Era of Cooperation
3.1 The International Health Division and the Start of the American Anti-Malarial 
Campaign
The story of malaria in the United States covers most of American history through 
the 1950’s.  It provides a successful example of philanthropic organizations working with 
states to execute public health campaigns.  By the turn of the 20 century, malaria had been 
heralded by many experts as the most devastating disease in the world (Williams, 1969; 
Farley, 2004). With the success of William Gorgas in 
containing the many diseases hindering the construction of 
the Panama Canal, millionaire John D. Rockefeller was 
inspired to attempt what had hitherto been inconceivable: 
to attempt the eradication of fatal diseases. By 1900 he put 
in place the makings of a health commission to analyze 
the problems to be addressed, and several years later, he 
created the Rockefeller Foundation to “promote the well 
being of mankind throughout the world” (See Figure 1) (Shaplen, 1964, p 21).  The 
foundation went on to be one of the largest philanthropic organizations of all time, 
undertaking campaigns regarding higher education, agricultural aid, civil programs, and 
most of all health initiatives. 
The Rockefeller Foundation was by far the most active organization of any kind to 
undertake public health campaigns in the early century.  In fact it addressed problems that 
the government had long ignored and allocated double the US federal health budget for 
Figure 3.1 The Rockefeller 
Foundation seal and motto
(Farley, 2004)
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their own campaigns (Williams, 1969).  Many Americans felt that the government was 
under reporting the prevalence of the disease and avoiding action by denying the 
significance of the epidemic.  Figure 2 depicts one of many political cartoons exaggerating 
the extent of such misinformation and avoidance of action.  Where the Foundation 
differentiated itself, however, was in its devotion to being a “partner but not a patron” of 
the government (Shaplen, 1964, p 21).  This desire to work within the infrastructure of a 
national bureaucracy resulted in the added benefit of the Rockefeller Foundation building 
the capabilities and awareness of domestic public health departments.  Instead of replacing 
government action, it illuminated health problems, and equipped the government to 
Figure 3.2  “Malaria is a Fashionable Disease” A malaria political 
cartoon from the late 1880’s.
15
address them.  This legacy, which it left after both its campaigns in the US and abroad, 
may have been one of the crowning achievements of the Foundations history.
 Despite its cooperation with governments, however, the Rockefeller Foundation 
sought to succeed where previous government intervention had been inadequate.  The 
International Health Division (IHD) of the Rockefeller Foundation was founded in 1913, to 
specifically carry out the health aspects of the Rockefeller family’s philanthropic vision 
(Farley, 2004; Shaplen, 1964).  The Foundation began its interest in public health in 
addressing the hookworm epidemic, but soon expanded its public health campaigns to 
include many other diseases.  They established two main objectives for the organization. 
First, they wished to educate the public and establish strong local public health 
departments.  Second, the Rockefeller Foundation sought to eradicate the worlds most 
virulent diseases, including malaria.  So began a long battle that would meet varied 
success. Regardless of the outcomes, however, the IHD of the Rockefeller Foundation was 
the first international non-governmental organization (NGO) to take on health issues that 
crossed borders, and its actions in the following decades set the precedence for inter-state 
cooperation and NGO intervention that continues to this day (Williams, 1969). 
One of the first battlegrounds undertaken by the IHD, was the American south, 
where malaria was crippling the agricultural industry, hampering social development, 
decreasing life expectancy and stifling economic growth (Humphreys, 2001; Harrison, 
1978; Williams, 1969).  Malaria epidemics had decimated the general worker population so 
much that previously flourishing mills were shutting down due to a lack of employees.  
The plight was even worse for southern tenant farmers and sharecroppers most of whom 
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were the already oppressed descendants of African American slaves.  These oppressed 
minorities were already facing near impossible debt conditions.  They were attempting to 
cultivate near infertile fields at high rents and very little profit to themselves.  Additionally 
fickle crop cycles and unpredictable droughts left little assurance of any annual profit. With 
the arrival of malaria epidemics, these farmers were left too weakened to cultivate their 
fields, harvesting even less than usual.  This exacerbated the already severe sharecropping 
debt cycle.  
Malaria had many other consequences throughout the nation.  School attendance in 
malarious regions dropped to rates as low as 50-25% (Humphreys, 2001; Harrison, 1978; 
Williams, 1969; Farley, 2004).  Construction projects were hindered and rising debt 
combined with decreasing productivity retarded economic development. By the early 
teens, all of these factors had become too dire to ignore.  Both the US government and the 
Rockefeller Foundation began to take notice. By 1914, the IHD considered malaria as its 
largest  pathogenic adversary. 
The interests of the IHD in the US were aided by several key individuals in the 
field of public health (Humphreys, 2001; Harrison, 1978; Williams, 1969; Farley, 2004).  
A veteran of the IHD hookworm campaigns, Wycliff Rose, soon expanded his public 
health interests to malaria.  After a worldwide tour to assess tropical diseases, he concluded 
that malaria was the world’s most serious health problem (Williams, 1969; Farley, 2004).  
To accomplish the IHD’s goal of disease eradication, Rose  and other IHD officials sought 
the help of the US Public Health Service (USPHS) forming the first collaboration between 
a state and an international non-governmental organization in the interests of a public 
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health campaign.  The USPHS volunteered the doctors Henry Rose Carter and Rudolph 
von Ezdorf who joined Rose in starting the first comprehensive domestic anti-malarial 
campaign.  
The appointment of General William Gorgas as Surgeon General aided the 
initiative as well (Harrison, 1978; Williams, 1969; Farley, 2004).  Gorgas had gained fame 
by saving the Panama Canal Project from the debilitating effects of yellow fever (also a 
mosquito carried disease).  In Panama Gorgas pioneered mosquito control as a method of 
general sanitation, and developed larvicidal regimes including oiling, drainage, screening, 
and brush clearing.  As Surgeon General and a commissioner of the IHD, he and the 
Foundation employees faced the challenge of adapting these methods for cost-effective, 
wide-scale use in the American south.
The IHD’s campaign with the US federal government essentially started as a social 
experiment (Humphreys, 2001; Harrison, 1978; Williams, 1969; Farley, 2004).  Fueled by 
the success of past experimental measures, the IHD began implementing control initiatives 
in the hardest hit regions.  An early postcard survey of rural doctors revealed that the south 
experienced about one million cases of reported malaria every year.  This confirmed the 
hard work ahead for the collaborative team.  The ultimate success of the program was due 
to three main breakthroughs however. The first break through, discussed above, was the 
developments of general William Gorgas in the management of mosquitos at the larval 
stage.  Methods such as drainage, water surface treatments,  brush clearing and building 
screening, when applied to civilian communities, all made huge strides in containing 
malaria.  The second major break through was the standardization of quinine doses, and the 
18
third was the development of local teams to tailor the campaign for each region.  While 
other IHD-USPHS methods were instrumental, these three developments  most 
significantly spurred on the success of the initiatives.
 The first campaigns used mostly the methods developed by Gorgas in Panama, 
such as drainage, screening, bed nets, oiling and brush clearing.  They took place in mill 
towns where production had stopped because workers were too weak to function.  Rose, 
Ezdorf and Carter began campaigns in mills towns in Mississippi, and North Carolina, 
where early programs met with so much success that they expanded the initiatives to 
Virginia, Alabama and other southern states.  The IHD made use of the new arsenic based 
larvicide Paris Green, which targeted only surface dwelling, filter-feeding larvae such as 
the anopheles. They also augmented the physical projects such as draining with 
Figure 3.3  A screening campaign ad
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informational campaigns regarding screening homes (see Figure 3.3) and avoidance of 
mosquito ridden areas.  
The second wave of success came from the experiments of Dr. Waller Leathers and 
Dr. Charles Bass (Humphreys, 2001; Harrison, 1978; Williams, 1969).  In Bolivar County, 
Mississippi, the doctors began studying the effectiveness of quinine alone in the 
containment of malaria .  Quinine had been used by South American Natives to treat 
malaria starting in the 1600’s, however the specific mechanism and dosages of the drug 
had never been closely studied, nor had the benefits been officially confirmed.  By 
administering various standardized dosages of quinine to infected populations of malaria 
patients, Leathers and Bass discovered that an eight week course of daily 10 grain quinine 
dosages had a 90% efficiency rate in curing the disease.  This momentous breakthrough 
resulted in the standardization of quinine dosages which in turn allowed it to be more 
widely distributed (outside of doctors offices) and lowered the cost.  As a result, quinine 
courses could be found at most local stores, annually costing the average person between 
$0.38 to $1.09 for treatment (Williams, 1969).  Over time the “Bass treatment,” as it was 
called,  became even further generalized when it was discovered to be a prophylactic 
treatment.  By the start of the World Wars, the US military had adopted quinine as a 
standard part of their health regime.
The success of the IHD collaborative in the US south continued after the adoption 
of quinine.  This was largely due to the groundbreaking policy of dividing the control of 
the IHD campaign among small localized teams (Humphreys, 2001; Harrison, 1978; 
Williams, 1969; Farley, 2004).  Each of these local teams tailored the anti-malarial 
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campaign to each region based on economic, social and ecological factors as well as the 
prevalence of locally available resources.  These teams also monitored success, carried out 
public awareness campaigns, and assessed the need for specific funding.  By narrowing the 
focus of each campaign, the IHD was well on its way to controlling malaria in the 
American South by the start of World War II.
The IHD presents an example of a successful government-NGO collaboration to 
address a serious public health problem. By working with government bureaucracies, 
implementing new mosquito control methods, introducing standardized prophylactic 
treatments and working on a tailored local level, the IHD was able to attack malaria in an 
unprecedented way.  However, the battle with malaria in the United States had one final 
chapter.  The discovery of DDT struck the final blow to an already retreating disease.  
However, as we will discuss in future chapters, while DDT revolutionized how people 
approached the problem, it created problems of its own.  
3.2 Brazil and the Eradication of a Species
The IHD had many campaigns outside of its collaboration with the American 
government.  Its global vision of malaria eradication was an ambitious one, with a near 
endless scope.  To start, the organization focused on regions where malaria was most 
virulent.  One such area was Brazil, which, in 1938, experienced one of the largest malarial 
epidemics in the western hemisphere (Williams, 1969).  In the face of this emergency, the 
International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation embarked on one of its most 
ambitious, and ultimately most successful, endeavors in eradicating an entire species from 
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the South American Continent.  The target was the deadly Anopheles gambiae  mosquito. 
The campaign not only saved countless lives in Brazil, but it also inspired similar 
campaigns in Sardinia, Sri-Lanka, Egypt, and other malaria ridden regions. 
 While malaria had previously existed in South America, the continent was blessed 
to have a native species of mosquito relatively ill-suited as a malaria vector (Williams, 
1969).  Because of this, malarial epidemics had been relatively contained in the region.  
With the advent of faster modes of transportation such as airplanes and fast ships, however, 
South American became increasingly connected to the rest of the world.  These effects of 
globalization were especially pronounced  during the World Wars, where supplies, troops 
and refugees were constantly traveling between continents.  It is thought that on one such 
exchange in 1930, the deadly Anopheles gambiae  mosquito made its way from Africa to 
Brazil.
The Anopheles gambiae mosquito is the world’s most deadly carrier of malaria for 
several reasons (Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978; Farley, 2004).  First, though only females 
can spread the parasite, gambiae females are the most efficient mosquito to spread malaria.  
Also, once the parasite has gestated in the mosquito the transmission rates to her future 
human victims are much higher than those of other mosquito species. The gambiae have 
frequent feeding patterns, and prefer mostly human blood meals.  This tendency causes the 
gambiae to seek out more developed human settlements and even transportation hubs 
instead of more rural areas.  As a result, the gambiae managed to find its way beyond the 
borders of its African home to parts of Asia, Europe and South America on mail carriers, 
produce shipments, and even passenger planes.  Because transportation times were 
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constantly growing faster, any trip shorter than the gambiae’s average life-span of several 
weeks could introduce a deadly, infected female to a new habitat.
The gambiae mosquito was discovered quite by chance in Brazil. The IHD already 
had a presence there, to battle yellow fever (also a mosquito borne disease), and had long 
been implementing the mosquito containment methods developed by Gorgas in Panama 
(Shaplen, 1964; Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978; Farley, 2004).  The Rockefeller 
Foundation employees were constantly carrying out assessments of mosquito containment 
to monitor progress.  During one such routine assessment an IHD doctor, Raymond 
Shannon, noticed gambiae larvae among his collected samples of other mosquitos larvae.  
This discovery so worried the IHD specialists that it was  reported as an emergency to the 
Foundation headquarters.  Within  weeks, unprecedented malarial epidemics began flaring 
up in surrounding areas, confirming the Foundation’s worst fears. With tens of thousands 
falling to the disease, active IHD field officer Dr. Fred Soper made the decision to 
commandeer the IHD Yellow Fever Field Service for use in stemming the Brazilian 
malarial epidemic.
 Fred Soper and his team unveiled an unprecedented campaign to eradicate the 
Anophelese gambiae from South America (Shaplen, 1964; Williams, 1969; Farley, 2004).  
Soper had previously distinguished himself in the field of malaria control but rose to 
prominence with his Brazilian campaign.   He went on to become the IHD’s star 
malariologist, and led future global campaigns with military precision.  The Brazilian 
campaign was fueled mostly by large amounts of manpower. IHD personnel were 
separated into military-like units, each trusted with a given region.  These units were 
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closely monitored by the inspectors and often Soper himself.  The field officers hand-
sprayed every known water source with Paris Green.  They sprayed every possible home 
with the pesticide pyrethrum.  Workers were even trained to scour building walls for 
resting mosquitos that they would then suck up with a suction bulb.  Never before had such 
a detailed, thorough, and work-intensive campaign been undertaken, but the Foundation 
employees know the dire consequences of failure..
The expense of such a detailed operation was certainly great, costing the Brazilian 
government $1.6 million and the Rockefeller Foundation $500,000, yet the benefits were 
invaluable (Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978; Shaplen; 1964; Farley, 2004). As Soper later 
stated, “No one could predict the success in an attempt at species eradication, but those 
cognizant of the situation could predict certain disaster... should an attempt at eradication 
not be made (Williams, 1969, p137).”  So it was that within ten years of its arrival in South 
America, the Anopheles gambiae was eradicated from the continent.  The IHD did not stop 
here, however.  Soper and his team worked with the Brazilian government to establish laws 
for mandatory fumigation of all shipments/transport vehicles entering the country.  Also 
they established teams to make routine inspections of water ways for gambiae larvae.  In 
the years following  a Foundation employee commissioned to write a review of the 
Brazilian mission assessed the situation astutely, stating:
This particular battle would seem to have been won at great labor and cost...[but] 
airplanes are now crossing the southern Atlantic with increasing frequency... a dead 
female gambiae was discovered after fumigation on a plane... and two more in 
January, 1942.  The original infestation... could readily have been started by a single 
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fertilized female.  Truly the price of liberty, as far as the malaria-carrying mosquito is 
concerned, is eternal vigilance (Fosdick, 1942, p. 396).
3.3  Sardinia and the Eradication of a Disease
Italy’s battle with malaria was a long one, made up of many stages.  Awareness 
specific to malaria began in the early 1900’s, with the efforts of Robert Koch and Angelo 
Celli, who saw malaria as a socio-economic disease prevalent in hardworking landless 
farm workers (Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978; Farley, 2004).  Left over from feudal times, 
these workers did not only represented the most infected populations; they also represented 
the most oppressed  demographic, with little hope of escaping from their bleak economic 
fate.  Koch and Celli gave voice to the under-represented plight of these workers, seeing 
the anti-malarial campaign as a way of bringing equality to the system.  
Unlike Soper and the IHD, Italian malariologists took a different approach to 
fighting malaria.  Instead of focusing on a battle against the mosquito vector, the Italian 
way focused on battling the disease in the infected populations through quinine treatments 
and general health care (Harrison, 1978; Farley, 2004; Shaplen, 1964).  Given the limited 
resources of the Italian government, funding for wide-scale drainage, water surface 
treatment, and brush clearing was simply not available.  This reality was compounded by 
the start of World War I which further drained the governmental funds of European nations. 
Instead Celli and Koch established subsidized quinine regimes, which they hoped would 
help the poorest citizens afford malaria treatment.  Despite these efforts, however, malaria 
rates in Italy remained high.  
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As malaria rates continued to plague tens of thousands of individuals, the 
Rockefeller Foundation turned its attention to Italy.  Dr. Lewis Hackett was set to assess 
the situation.  While he saw merit in the treatment methods of containment, he strongly 
advocated some attempts at vector control.  By the 1930’s the Foundation had collaborated 
with the Italian government to create an Italian Institute of Public Health from which to 
base their campaigns.  Hackett, later joined by Soper, proposed a two-front offensive 
attacking both the mosquito and the parasite.  After the success of the Brazilian campaign, 
they advocated localized drainage, larvicidal, pesticidal and brush clearing tactics  
combined with quinine treatments. The was the most comprehensive multifaceted IDH 
endeavor yet.
Unfortunately, IHD efforts faced a  stand-still with the start of World War II.  Once 
Italy fell to Allies, however, the need for an efficient solution became even more pressing.  
Manpower was dwindling as the war demanded more labor and resources, and malarial 
epidemics were weakening an already depleted population.  Hackett and Soper decided to 
attack the situation with military precision using their Brazilian strategy with some 
modifications.  With fewer workers, they had to give less individual attention to every 
region.  To compensate they added more pesticidal and larvicidal treatments, as well as 
prophylactic treatments of quinine.   The use of Paris Green as a water larvicide and 
pyrethrum as a indoor surface pesticide both hit mosquito populations hard.   Additional 
funding from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
further augmented the resources for the Italian campaign.
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The year 1944 heralded the advent of DDT as a pesticidal  treatment (Tren & Bate, 
2001).  This struck the final blow.  DDT had far more staying power than pyrethrum, and a 
single house spraying of DDT resulted in months of mosquito proofing with no side effects 
on humans.  Almost immediately, DDT began decreasing the numbers of infected 
mosquitos who could spread the disease ( Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978; Farley, 2004).  
The house spraying was especially effective because mosquitos were most likely to 
become infected by biting malaria victims in homes.  After biting such a victim, if the 
blood laden mosquito rested on a house wall or ceiling, it would immediately die.  Also, by  
Figure 3.4  A Wartime European DDT Ad 
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spraying the insides of buildings, the DDT had limited opportunity to spread into the 
environment.  
Figure 3.5 “The 4 Freedoms from Malaria” World War II Anti-Malarial Ad 
Advocating a many-fronted attack on the disease
By containing infected populations with quinine regimes, and containing vector 
populations with pesticides, the  IHD began to see a significant improvement in Italy. 
Malarial epidemics began decreasingly rapidly.  Soper and Hackett seemed to have found 
the key to success in a multifaceted strategy that addressed both preventative and curative 
tactics.  The island of Sardinia provided the best example of the sweeping success of this 
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campaign.  From 1946 through 1953, malaria cases dropped from 75,000 to one.  After 
1953 malaria had been completely eradicated from the island.
Though individuals such as Soper considered the mission as a whole a failure due 
to the continued survival of mosquitos in Italy, the IHD campaign was more successful at 
stemming mediterranean malaria than ever imagined (Farley, 2004; Harrison, 1978; 
Williams, 1969).  By targeting the goals of its mission, the IHD struck a swift blow in a 
concentrated amount of time.  It combined the successes of previous campaigns by using 
environmental tactics such as draining, chemical advances such as new pesticides, 
population control with subsidized treatments, and preventative measures with 
prophylactic treatments.  Because of this, they were able to decrease the infected 
population to unsustainable levels, therein wiping out the disease.  The Italian story proves 
that with fewer resources than in Brazil and attention to the time sensitive nature of anti-
malarial campaigns, the disease could be eradicated.
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Chapter IV: Cold War Changes
With the end of World War II came a new world order of increased inter-
governmental cooperation.  Yet this new international system departed significantly from 
the Rockefeller type altruism seeking “the well being of all mankind.”  Instead as the Cold 
War set in, health aid and  developmental assistance became a political tool used by the 
worlds most powerful nations to gain clout over their “allies”.  Health policies were 
created, not as a collaboration between aid organizations and host nations as in Sardinia 
and Brazil, but as unidirectional mandates from hegemonic powers.  Issues like the use of 
DDT and the containment of AIDs clearly indicate the prevalence of western ideas and 
values on developing world health campaigns. While some say this trend changed with the 
end of the Cold War, the current world order remains remarkably similar.  Be it neocolonial 
economic actions, Cold War political actions, or pressures from the “War on Terror,”  the 
past sixty years of international public health campaigns have been dominated by the 
economic, national security, and political interests of  a select few nations.  It is this uneven 
partnership between the developing and developed world that has left current campaigns 
stilted and out of touch with the socio-cultural, economic and ecological realities of the 
regions they serve.
4.1 Malaria, Neocolonialism, and Technology: the Egyptian Case
 By the start of World War II, many changes in western held colonies altered the 
relationship between man, mosquito and malarial parasite.  Paramount among these were 
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economic and technological changes in agriculture and industry that vastly affected the 
local ecosystems and new political tensions which led to the politicization of global public 
health initiatives and health aid.  Of the new technologies, the most influential was the 
widespread adoption of DDT, which, by 1946, was being used throughout most of the 
world (Harrison,1978; Ten & Bates, 2001).  However, advances in agriculture and civil 
infrastructure such as dams, irrigation systems and improved methods of transport also had 
a notable effect.  In addition to these technological changes, burgeoning Cold War tensions 
and the emergence of strong intergovernmental organizations such as the UN created a 
shift from state and non-governmental initiated health campaigns to global campaigns by 
hegemon dominated intergovernmental organizations.  All of these changes combined to 
create a new environment in which malarial epidemics flourished.
The development of new technologies, along with the start of the world wars 
significantly changed the supply and demand of goods in the global market and led to 
changes in the nature of malarial epidemics.  In some cases, these changes even introduced 
malaria to new regions (Mitchell, 2002). During this time, the previously held colonial 
model of production was adapted to provide more specialized goods from a given region.  
Most arable land was streamlined to produce one of a few high-profit crops including 
sugar, peanuts, and rubber (Wright, 1997).  In order to do this colonists introduced new 
technological aids such as fertilizers, irrigation systems, and other farming equipment, but 
this narrowing of production and reliance on western technology further exacerbated the 
colonies’ economic reliance on the West (Mitchell, 2002).  This reliance continued to 
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cripple colonial regions even after independence from the colonizing power. The case of 
Egypt provides an insightful example of this technological western intervention. 
Egypt had gained partial independence from England in 1882, but the British 
colonial influence remained strong.  With the outbreak of World War II, the British all but 
retook complete control of the nation,  and remained involved through much of the mid-
century. While mostly native raw materials had been extracted from Africa before World 
War II, during wartime colonial powers began converting all available land to the 
production of a few new cash crops (Mitchell, 2002). The main crop of this nature in Egypt 
was sugar.  The British converted as much land as possible to sugar production, leaving 
little land for growing food.  To make the terrain suitable for sugar cultivation, the British 
built dams along the Nile River putting an end to the traditional floods that had watered 
crops and replenished nutrients to the soil. To compensate for the loss of these flood related 
benefits, the British built irrigation systems with open channels that watered the fields.  
These channels created an ideal breeding ground for waterborne diseases and insects such 
as mosquitoes.  
Also, with the new plantation based industry native tracts of farming land were 
seized and combined into large foreign run plantations (Anderson, 2006; Mitchell, 2002; 
Williams, 1969).  The displaced, unemployed natives were forced to find work, often at the 
very plantations that had disrupted their traditional livelihoods.  Better transport also 
facilitated new workers immigrating to the plantations.  Both indigenous and transplanted 
plantation workers moved to crowded worker villages along the outskirts of the 
compounds.  Also British wartime construction projects such as roads and military supply 
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railways, left strings of ditches and pits which also collected water.  These new expanses of 
still water channels and the congested worker settlements combined to create a perfect 
environment for a malarial epidemic.  The only missing factor was the malaria 
plasmodium.
The expansion of infrastructure and advancements in transportation technology 
before and during World War II, facilitated a wide expansion in trade and export which 
introduced new diseases and species into Egypt (Mitchell, 2002; Williams, 1969).  As a 
result of better transportation, ports and export highways saw more traffic than ever before. 
Goods from all over the world, became available in previously remote areas.  Workers 
were also able to move more easily, traveling to plantations, factories and other labor 
centers.  However, along with foreign workers and goods come foreign insects and 
diseases.  So it was that in 1942, the Anopheles gambiae first found its way to Egypt 
carrying inside it, the deadly malaria parasite.  It is thought that the Sub-Saharan mosquito 
and parasite arrived in Egypt either with produce from the south or on airplanes carrying 
war supplies from the north.  Either way, the previously unexposed Egyptian public had no 
natural defenses against the disease, leaving them unknowingly vulnerable.
Once the disease was introduced, malaria spread rapidly through out crowded labor 
settlements.  Modern malariologists now know that with a sufficient vector population, a 
malaria epidemic can take hold in a completely uninfected population within one month 
(Williams, 1969; Mitchell, 2002; Basch, 1990). By 1943, malaria had spread to epidemic 
numbers in Egypt, but the neocolonial British authorities suppressed this information from 
the public.  With a war in Europe, they feared that discontent in Africa would lead to 
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distracting uprisings.  In an echo of its colonial philosophy of rule, the British sacrificed 
the well-being of the native population and the public’s right to information in order to 
maintain unchallenged control.  Also, by hiding the numbers dying of malaria, the British 
authorities lost valuable time in fighting the epidemic, and by the time the number of 
deaths became too significant to ignore, the benevolent “white men” had a new “burden” 
in the worsening war in Europe.  This left the puppet Egyptian government to try and stem 
an unprecedented health crisis.
 The introduction and widespread adoption of western synthetic chemical 
compounds added to the severity of the malaria epidemic. With the construction of Nile 
River dams, native farmers lost the annual floods that fertilized their fields.  The British 
brought in a new alternative in fertilizers to replenish the diminishing nitrates in the soil. In 
his book Rule of Experts, Timothy Mitchell claims that this influx of chemicals had as vast 
an evolutionary effect at the cellular level as dams and irrigation systems had on the 
national level (Mitchell, 2002, p. 21, 25).  Mitchell proposes three main ways in which the 
new fertilizers accomplished this.  
First, artificial fertilizers are difficult to apply and are easily washed into nearby 
bodies of water (Mitchell, 2002).  Once in these fertilizers entered Egyptian streams and 
ponds, they caused previously insignificant pond plants to flourish.  Bodies of water 
became so clogged with plant growth that it interfered with currents, creating near still 
streams.  The new growth also provided shelter to mosquito larvae, allowing the vectors to 
flourish as well.
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Ironically, the second way the adoption of fertilizers aided the spread of malaria, 
was by contributing to a famine that left natives weak and vulnerable (Mitchell, 2002). 
Because, most land had been converted to grow crops for European countries, little land 
remained for native food production.  In addition, Egyptian farmers had become dependent 
on western fertilizers to nourish their crops.  With the worsening of the war, the supplies of 
foreign fertilizers were severely curtailed, and the supplies that got through were reserved 
for western agricultural interests.  As a result native farmers faced severely diminished 
harvests that led to a nationwide famine.
The final consequence of fertilizer that Mitchell proposes is the previously 
mentioned concentration of workers caused by the expansion of the sugar industry 
(Mitchell, 2002).  Mass production of cash crops, was only sustainable because of 
synthetic compounds, and the western method of agriculture replaced the traditional family 
farm system.  With an increased mosquito population, a malnourished human population 
and new concentrated plantation settlements, the malaria epidemic took a strong hold in 
Egypt.
While the story of Egypt seems remarkable, the country was not alone as a victim 
to the introduction of new diseases.  During and after the war, malaria spread to previously 
unaffected areas of the South Pacific and South America.   While actions of the English 
were deplorable, the British neocolonial interventions in Egypt were representative of a 
widespread western philosophy.  Despite the post-war deterioration of colonial empires,  
Italy, France, Germany, and the United States exploited the resulting developing nations 
claiming them as “spheres of influence.”   As a result these struggling nations were further 
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exploited  for war resources and cheap production.  The case of Egypt simply illustrates the 
far-reaching social and health implications of such exploitation.
4.2 Echoes of the Cold War 
With the end of World War II, the international political arena underwent several 
drastic changes that altered the nature of health initiatives worldwide, and malaria 
initiatives in particular.  First, after the failure of the League of Nations, states  saw the 
need for strong intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and came together to form 
multilateral groups such as the United Nations.  This shifted political trends away from the 
networks of state-to-state alliances that had previously dominated the diplomatic world.  
Second, the post-war era saw the rise of two main hegemons, the United States of America, 
and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, whose struggle for dominance colored most 
global initiatives thereafter.  With the start of the Cold War these nations came to dominate 
the international political scene with their respective ideologies, making previously benign 
issues such as health, into arenas in their battle for superiority.  Foreign aid and 
development became opportunities for the most benevolent ideology to “win.”  However 
this battle to be the most benevolent power polarized humanitarian work, moving away 
from the universal approach of the Rockefeller Foundation and toward an aid distribution 
system controlled by a select few nations.  This US - USSR competition continued through 
the end  of the Cold War.  However, while some of the developments of the Cold War 
dissipated with the collapse of the Soviet Union,  many of the trends set into motion during 
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this time continued through to this day impeding the progress of comprehensive global 
health initiatives.
4.2.1 The Rise of International Organizations and the Cold War Politicization of Public 
Health Initiatives  
While at the start of the Cold War, Americans supported  Rockefeller Foundation 
style comprehensive, philanthropic programs, but as the conflict progressed, this support 
diminished and was replaced by a move toward strategic aid  intended for specific political 
goals.  This shift was motivated in part by the domestic “red scare”  and by a desire to gain 
an edge in the conflict between Communism and Capitalism.
Immediately following World War II, American domestic opinion still held closely 
to the ideals of the Rockefeller Foundation.  At the time, the Rockefeller Foundation was 
the only organization pursuing international health programs (Cueto, 2007). With its motto 
seeking “the betterment of mankind throughout the world,” the Foundation represented 
philanthropic altruism of an unprecedented scale (Shaplen, 1964, p 21).  For the five years 
following the war, Americans continued to benefit from this altruism, as the IHD of the 
Foundation pursued its eradication campaigns in North America.  After the adoption of 
DDT during the war, however, cases of malaria had drastically dropped, and by 1953 
malaria as almost disappeared from the American south. 
The near eradication malaria did not stem Americans concern about a global 
eradication program, however.  Rather, they remained committed to the idea for two 
reasons.  First, with American troops stationed  across the world, there was a fear that 
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infected soldiers returning home could bring with them enough malaria cases to restart the 
epidemic (Harrison 1978; Cueto, 2007).  This fueled the continued support of foreign 
programs as a matter of national security.  As seen in Figure 4.1  preventing malaria was
Figure 4.1 Malaria Control in War Areas - a wartime malarial campaign poster
W,G.W.A. 18 THE SUPERSTRUCTURE BUILT ltPDX THE SOLiD POUIYaATlQN OF 
ST*ff A#@ LOOAL XEdtTH AGENCIES FUR THE PROYECT#ON OF Pf#ttf fMfi 
k S l  ANB WAR WORKERS. 
This cartoon, from the Malaria Control in War Areas report for 1942-1943 (p. 51,depicts the mosquito 
as an enemy airplane carrying a disease "bomb. "Here the emphasis is on the separation of the mosquito 
from barracks, ships, and industry. 
 
38
given serious treatment as a war measure (Humphreys, 1996).  The US army even 
published an informational pamphlet illustrated by Dr. Suess to stress the significance of 
malaria to GIs stationed abroad (see Figure 4.2) (Leaf, 1943). 
Figure 4.2 An Excerpt from Dr. Seuss’s Informational GI Anti-
malarial Comic This is Ann. (text by Munro Leaf)
 The second reason for American post-war support of anti-malarial campaigns was 
the thought that malaria prevented productiveness and therein could spark another global 
economic depression (Litsios, 1996; Packard, 1997).  The wartime production boom had 
buoyed the previously flailing American economy, and Americans know only a steady 
supply of raw materials could support domestic production. George Marshall, creator of 
the Marshall Plan once stated, “The conquest of diseases which hold millions weak and 
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inefficient... are tremendously important requirements of the world situation... tropical 
regions... produce large quantities large quantities of materials required by the industrial 
areas of the temperate regions (Packard, 1997, p 97).”  Marshall is simply one of many 
State Department officials who stressed the connection between public health and 
prodctivity as a way to prevent another economic recession.  Economist C.E. Winslow also 
pointed out that with a “large population of invalids crippled by preventable disease, it is 
difficult to see how one can seriously question the importance of the contribution of public 
health to global prosperity (Packard, 1997, p 98).”  
This belief that health and productivity were interconnected, was also seen as a key 
in the conflict between Communism and Capitalism (Packard, 1997; Litsios, 1996).  
Disintegrating colonial networks gave ample places for the US and USSR to try and 
expand their “spheres of influence.”  Health campaigns were seen as a way to make wide-
spread contact with the populations of  these new developing nations. Public health 
campaigns were integrated into the Eisenhower administration’s  involvement in Thailand, 
Vietnam etc.  For example, DDT house spraying teams in India were the only officials to 
come in regular contact with rural areas.   As James Simmons, Dean of the Harvard School 
of Public Health stated in 1950, “The health and manpower of  the free nations of the 
world are now the most vital resources in our fight against Communism (Packard, 1997, p. 
98).”
Public health was incorporated into US Cold War foreign policy in more ways than 
one.  John Foster Dulles, the strong-willed Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, 
strove to integrate US Cold War policy into all areas of foreign policy, including aid 
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organizations (Cueto, 2007).  Dulles saw fields like public health as arenas where the 
expansion of capitalist interest and Cold War disputes could play out.  For example, under 
Dulles, the State Department used the nascent Bureau of International Organization Affairs  
(BIOA) to monitor and influence the actions of UN subcommittees like the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  The BIOA made 
sure that as the largest financial contributor, US interests were not compromised in WHO 
actions.  
The actions of Dulles were not unusual in the post war political climate.  Only a 
few years prior, the Truman administration used American financial clout to control the 
actions of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Litsios, 1996).  
The United States contributed 75% of UNRRA’s financial endowment, and as such, 
Truman felt they deserved the right to unilaterally make decisions regarding the 
distribution of aid.  As Cold War tensions mounted, the administration decided to 
“distribute the benefits of its economic power to maximize political influence rather than 
suffer the dissipation of its power in an international association (Paterson, 1992, p. 112).”   
Sympathy with American ideals became a central requirements of receiving aid, and 
Eastern block nations were pointedly excluded from UN aid allotments (Litsios, 1996). 
Truman’s term saw the implementation of many other similar policies including the well 
know Marshall Plan and Point Four program.  New Deal era hero Fiorello LaGuardia 
cautioned strongly against the US government’s new direction, warning “against the 
consequences if America  tried to use its food and money as instruments of political 
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domination (Litsios, 1996, p. 269).”  However, the power of international aid was too 
strong a weapon by which to achieve American political interests.
This move toward strategic aid was left unchallenged in part because of the climate 
of fear in the American public (Litsios, 1996;Packard, 1997).  The Red Scare left 
politicians and activists alike threatened by the fear of being labeled a communist.  As fears 
mounted, support for comprehensive aid programs waned, and only projects that support 
“American ideals” were seen as excusable expenses.  Even domestic programs suffered 
from this change in public opinion.  Previously extolled programs like the Tennessee 
Valley Authority became seen in a “reddish hue” and were claimed as “communist fronts,” 
which seriously hampered the expansion of such programs (Litsios, 1996, p.271).  With the 
scrutiny of domestic development programs, international programs faced even more 
severe skepticism.  The only programs seen as justifiable were emergency aid progams for 
countries in crisis and some development programs intended to expand American “spheres 
of influence”.  This attitude continues to this day and is characteristic of a narrow  
“temporary solution”  approach to healthcare.
The evolution of Cold War era public health initiatives was strongly influenced by 
the struggle between Communism and Capitalism.  Though Americans initially were 
concerned for international public health in terms of protecting returning GI’s and 
preventing future economic depression, these concerns soon gave way to a suspicion of 
non-strategic aid programs.  The resulting trends may have started during the Cold War, 
but have become ingrained into American foreign policy.  The politicization of aid 
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programs and a fear of being seen as un-American are just two of the many Cold War 
trends that have continued through today.
4.2.2 Continuities from the Cold War to Today
The Cold War may have ended over a decade ago, but the trends in international 
Public Health that it set in motion, continue to be evident.  Most telling, are the parallels 
we see in the rhetoric surrounding the “War on Terror.”   Cold War anti-communist 
sentiments brought forth many similar concerns.  As a result of these climates of fear, both 
of these time periods have seen: a politicization of developmental goals; an increased 
fragmentation of international health campaigns; a shift away from comprehensive 
programs and toward spot solutions for health emergencies; the adoption of policies that 
build dependancy not self-reliance in developing nations; and a “one-plan-fits-all” health 
strategy that trivializes regional social, economic, cultural and ecological differences. 
The use of international aid to gain political clout may have begun during the Cold 
War, but the trend continues today (Litsios, 1996).  Sanctions, holds on food aid, and a 
demonization of nations that do not follow these policies are scenarios that are common 
today.  American politicians have extended their  “with us or against us” policy to matters 
of international aid as well.  Just as Truman’s administration wanted sole control over the 
UNRRA’s distribution of post war reconstruction aid, the American government believes 
that aid should only be distributed to allies in the “war on terror” (Litsios, 1996; Packard, 
1997).  The rhetoric surrounding this sentiment has not changed much in the past sixty 
years.  For example in the 1950’s the American director of the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
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Organization described the US demands to control UNRRA funding as follows: “ This 
movement.... will prove to be the most significant development in our lifetime.  I believe it 
can effectively counteract the forces that work to undermine freedom and threaten world 
peace (Litsios, 1996, p. 269).”  Similar connections between loving freedom, and limiting 
aid have been made in reference to the war on terror as well. By conjoining the issues of 
international aid and freedom, politicians can use economic leverage over developing 
nations to maintain their national interests.
Decreased support for international health aid that was sparked by the Red Scare 
caused a shift away from comprehensive anti-malarial campaigns favoring instead spot 
solutions to health crises (Litsios, 1996; Packard, 1997).  This “emergency mode” stopped 
support for programs expanding primary care and health infrastructure.  As a result, the 
general well-being of populations were ignored, leaving weakened populations ripe for 
epidemics.  This shift toward selective health care often came under the guise of cost-
effectiveness, however wide scale emergency measures and crisis control strategies are 
often far more expensive than maintaining basic levels of general health (Rosenberg, 
2004).  Randall Packard criticizes this approach pointing out that “define[ing] health as the 
absence of disease... ignore[s] a broad range of health problems (Packard, 1997, p.112).”  
Indeed, prophylactic approaches like supporting health education, food programs, and 
economic development could significantly curtail a community’s susceptibility to disease 
in a cost efficient way.
This myopic view of overarching health problems, caused a fragmentation of health 
campaigns both during and after the Cold War.  Not only were solutions focused around 
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specific health crises, they also were focused on more urban areas with existing 
infrastructure (Packard, 1997; Litsios, 1997; Tren &Bate, 2001; Needham, 2003).  This 
method is especially ill suited for malarial campaigns, because they require regular contact 
with entire populations.  Unlike smallpox campaigns of the past, which only required one 
visit to rural populations in order to administer a vaccine, anti-malarial campaigns require 
house sprayings, education campaigns regarding bed nets, administration of prophylactic 
medication, and other measures.  While some believe this medical knowledge will trickle 
down from urban to rural regions within a country, the infrastructure of developing nations 
often makes this highly unlikely.  
The education aspect of campaigns is especially imperative in rural regions 
(Needham, 2003).  For example, in Mali, where annual malaria rates are at 150% (meaning 
the entire population experiences repeated infections every year), rural programs have been 
implemented through a collaboration between the government and foreign aid agencies.  
The government hires a few individuals from each community and trains them for several 
weeks in education campaigns and house spraying.  These locals then return home to teach 
their peers about bed net use and ways to avoid mosquito ridden areas.  They also carry out 
house sprayings with equipment supplied by the government and foreign aid agencies. 
While these efforts are time consuming, the end results are worth the cost.  Neither 
mosquitoes nor parasites observe the boundary between urban and rural when infecting 
human victims, so containing the overall infected population is the only way to curtail 
burgeoning epidemics.  But Mali is the exception, not the rule.  Comprehensive urban-rural 
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programs are rare, and require a strong collaboration with the host government.  When 
successful, however, these programs are highly effective.
Mali also provides an unusual example of how aid agencies can collaborate with a 
government to create self-sufficient public health programs (Litsios, 1996; Packard, 1997; 
Needham, 2003).  Again they are the exception.  Cold War methods of administering aid 
often ignored the potential contributions of host nations.  Western nations often adopted a 
trustee mentality believing that developing nations faced health crises due to an inability to 
understand and address the problem themselves.  This ideology continues to today, where 
western nations think money and technology alone can equip developing nations. Instead 
of making use of local information, and building local infrastructure to handle future 
crises, this method involved a unidirectional flow of money, technology, methods and 
manpower from developed to developing nations.  As a result host nations were unable to 
develop their own public health infrastructure and remained dependent on western nations.  
Cynthia Needham discusses this phenomenon in her book Global Disease Eradiation 
saying, “ malaria eradication programs are  “Not something an international heath 
community can do to or for people.  It can only be done with them... As long as malaria 
workers and local communities cooperated, it was possible to accomplish [eradication]  
(Needham, 2003, pp .22-21).”  By equipping locals with the tools to continue anti-malarial 
programs, Mali set a trend in moving away from the Cold War “trustee” mentality.
The final trend that continues from Cold War public health policies is the adherence 
to one global anti-malarial strategy without considering regional social, economic, 
ecological and cultural differences.  Needham describes this as a “one-plan-fits-all” 
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ideology (Needham, 2003, p27).  For example, part of the US demands in unilaterally 
controlling UNRRA funding included dictating where and how the money was spent 
(Litsios, 1996).  Similarly, once DDT became illegal in the United States,  the US 
stipulated that no nations using DDT could receive aid (see Section 4.3).  These kinds of 
mandates made up a western dictated anti-malarial strategy intended to apply to all nations. 
This narrow focus regarding the costs and benefits of  anti-malarial measures 
ignored fundamental differences between regions and limited the effectiveness of such 
campaigns. For example, Asia and Africa require very different methods of malaria control 
(Tren & Bate, 2001). Because Asia has smaller malarious regions, and a less virulent 
species of mosquito, vector control methods and even mosquito eradication measures can 
be effective.  In Africa, however, the native gambiae species is both resilient and virulent, 
and populations are widely infected.  Therefore, vector control methods are imperative, but 
cannot suffice to control the disease alone.  Medication, and containment of infected 
populations are also necessary.  Homogenous malaria control programs do not take these 
kinds of regional differences into consideration, and therefore waste resources in areas 
where alternative would be more cost efficient.  Nowhere is this lack of regional sensitivity 
more apparent than in the case of DDT.
4.3 The DDT Double Standard 
The case of  DDT represents a clear example of how, in the current hegemon 
dominated system, developing nations are pressurized into adopting public health 
campaigns  that take no consideration of their individual situations.  Despite its invaluable 
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role in fighting malaria in the United States, DDT may be the most infamous synthetic 
chemical compound in the world.  Demonized as one of history’s largest enemies to the 
environment, DDT came to epitomize the danger of human interference with the balance of 
nature (Gladwell, 2001; Humphreys, 1996; Rosenberg, 2004; Williams, 1969).  It is ironic, 
therefore, that up through the mid-century DDT was considered a miracle compound, seen 
as containing the solution to agriculture and health problems worldwide.  Paul Muller, the 
Swiss scientist who discovered its pesticidal properties, won the Nobel Prize for his work, 
and DDT was touted as the solution to all insect ridden diseases.  By using this compound, 
the United States and other nations were able to almost eradicate malaria from their 
populations, but once its adverse effects on wildlife were discovered, DDT fell out of favor 
with the Western world.  Today,  its is banned throughout much of the world.   However, 
many believe that DDT symbolizes the double standard that the western world holds.  
Having already benefitted from widespread use of DDT, at the cost of the environment, 
western countries now hold developing nations to a standard that they can scarce afford.
4.3.1 Love and Hate: America’s Varied History with DDT
Since the publishing of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962,  DDT has become 
unquestioningly demonized throughout most of the world.  As with many other issue 
trends originating in the West, anti-DDT policies and sentiments have trickled down to 
every level of the international community (Gladwell, 2001; Humphreys, 1996; Rosenberg, 
2004; Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978).  What few people recognize, however, is that the 
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Figure 4.3  DDT is good for m-e-e-e!  -  A DDT Ad in Time Magazine
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adverse effects of DDT in the environment, were a result of incredibly large-scale use in 
the United States.  This was mostly a result of agricultural DDT use, where the chemical 
was used by the ton to coat large areas.  Therefore, while the benefits of DDT use in 
fighting malaria were many, a far smaller amount of DDT could have been used to achieve 
the same objective.  
DDT’s use as a pesticide was discovered accidentally in 1941, by a Swiss chemist 
named Paul Muller (Gladwell, 2001; Humphreys, 1996; Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978).  
Muller had been seeking a superior moth repellent when he discovered that even minute 
residual quantities of the compound could kill insects for long periods afterward.  The 
promise of Muller’s discovery centered around the fact that it seemed to have no adverse 
affects on humans.  In fact, to this day no studies have proven any such adverse effects on 
human beings.  Excitement over the new miracle compound spread, and by 1943 wide-
scale production had begun.  DDT was the longest lasting and least expensive pesticide in 
history with no human side effects.  Many saw it as the answer to traditional agricultural 
and health problems. 
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Figure 4.4  A 1947 ad for “Kill-Coat” pesticide touting DDT’s lasting qualities
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What few realize is that in the fight against malaria, DDT was almost exclusively 
used to treat the inside walls of buildings (Gladwell, 2001; Humphreys, 1996; Tren & Bate, 
2001; Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978).  In 1944, this process began in Italy, where Soper 
replaced pyrethrum building treatments with DDT house spraying.  The process was 
resoundingly successful.  Also, because the insides of home experienced such little 
exposure to the elements, there was almost no seepage into the environment, allowing 
DDT sprayings to last up to a year.  This not only cut down drastically on the necessary 
manpower, it also struck a sharp blow to the population of infected mosquitos.  Because 
mosquitos often rest on nearby surfaces after a blood meal, mosquitos that bit malaria 
patients in DDT treated homes had a far less likely chance of surviving to bite again.  
Reports of success in Sardinia and other parts of Italy were so glowing that by the end of 
the year many other nations including the United States began adopting DDT use.  
However, it is here that the story often becomes blurred.
Contrary to widely held belief, the overuse of DDT in America was not 
predominantly in public health, but in agriculture (Tren & Bate, 2001; Rosenberg, 2001; 
Humphreys, 1996).  With the discovery of the worlds strongest pesticide, farmers began 
dispensing DDT by the ton.  Crop dusters and irrigation system-like delivery methods 
sprayed unprecedented amounts of the compound into the environment.  These methods 
made it impossible to stop DDT from washing into water sources and collecting in food 
chains.  This excessive use of DDT lies in stark contrast to the few grams needed to spray 
the insides of a home.  The latter is all that is needed for years of protection against 
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malarious mosquitos.  As seen in Figure 4.3, DDT was heralded as a resource for better 
food and better health, but its overuse had serious consequences.
 By 1962, and the start of the environmental movement, the effects of large 
amounts of DDT on birds and fish came into the public eye (Rosenberg, 2004; Tren & 
Bate, 2001; Williams, 1969; Harrison, 1978).  The compound built up in their systems and 
could not be broken down.  If exposed to large amount of DDT, birds and fish could die.  
Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring brought this to the public eye.  At the time DDT was 
used almost exclusively in agriculture and for some household fumigation.   With almost 
negligible levels of mosquito borne illnesses in the United States, however, the case for 
DDT was waning.  By 1972, the nascent EPA had banned DDT use altogether.
The vilification of DDT in western society had vast impacts on developing nations.  
Once DDT was banned in the United States other nations and international organizations 
began to follow suit (Tren & Bate, 2001).  Organizations like Greenpeace, the World 
Wildlife Federation, USAID, and the World Health Organization all added anti-pesticide 
clauses to their funding protocol.  USAID in particular had to suddenly terminate many 
anti-malarial programs because of its policy to follow US domestic law in oversees 
ventures.   Even in organizations without mandates connecting them to US policies, there 
were pressures to conform to the western standard.  Soon the use of DDT became an 
assured way to lose foreign aid.  As a result nations were forced to seek alternative, more 
expensive  methods of Malaria control.  However, this change did not go unchallenged.  A 
global debate continues as to whether small amounts of DDT should be allowed in 
developing nations. 
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4.3.2 DDT in Current World Politics
When DDT became outlawed in western nations, it immediately fell out of favor in 
international aid organizations as well.  There are two schools of thought regarding this 
trend.  The first is represented by Rachel Carson and the environmental movement and has 
been widely adopted by most of the western world.  The second point of view  has gained 
momentum in recent years and believes that the issue of DDT should re-examined.  This 
latter group purports several reasons for DDT to be given a second chance.  First, they 
claim that if used in much smaller quantities, the potential benefits of DDT outweigh the 
negligible environmental costs.  For example, most Americans remain unaware that no 
scientific study has ever documented any adverse effects of DDT on humans (Tren & Bate, 
2001; Rosenberg, 2004).  Instead DDT was banned for its effects on wildlife. Second, they 
contend that the current costs of DDT are a result of irresponsible overuse in the West, and 
represent a double standard of environmental responsibility.  Third, they believe the cost-
benefit value judgement that maligned DDT represents only a western view point, and does 
not take into consideration the value of human life in the third world.  Finally they argue 
that DDT could be used in the short term to acutely address malarial epidemics.  Then, 
once these epidemics are under control, DDT use could be discontinued.
In the current global debate, there is a strong argument for severely restricted use of 
DDT in specific health campaigns.  As discussed in previous sections, the major source of 
DDT build up in the environment in the past, came from wide scale agricultural use.  
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Farmers used tons of the compound to coat every crop imaginable (Harrison, 1978; 
Williams, 1969; Humphreys, 1996; Webster, 2001; Rosenberg, 2004).  In contrast, studies 
have been done illustrating the effectiveness of DDT house spraying that only requires a 
few hundred milligrams per house (Tren & Bate, 2001; Rosenberg, 2004).  These sprayings 
last at least a year, if not longer, and have very little opportunity to enter the surrounding 
environment, as they coat only inside walls.  Aside from being very long lasting, these 
house spraying are by far the cheapest available pesticide treatment, often costing less than 
a dollar per person per year (Rosenberg, 2004). Additionally they act as a highly efficient 
infection barrier by attacking mosquitos in the place where they are most likely to become 
infected: the home.  In addition, by condoning DDT use only in the most severely affected 
regions, large scale environmental build up can be curtailed, while saving millions of lives.
The build up of DDT in the environment may have had significant consequence, 
but it did not happen over night.  It took over thirty years of excessive use and the related 
environmental side effects for the West to acknowledge the dangers of DDT use, even 
though the effects of DDT on wildlife were known since its inception (Harrison, 1978; 
Berenbaum, 2005).  As early as 1944, US public health officials warned of its deadly effect 
on fish and birds.  However, it was not until the effects of mosquito borne illness were 
negligible in the West, and DDT was no longer needed to save lives, that the US 
government adopted a pro-environmental policy.  Some view this change in policy as a 
double standard, advocating only those environmental policies that have no significant cost 
to the West.  Indeed other current environmental debates support this view. For example, 
despite the extensive evidence regarding the dire consequences of large scale greenhouse 
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gas emissions, the United States refuses to accept the Kyoto protocol.  Instead it remains 
one of the largest  contributors of greenhouse gases.  Many politicians claim that the 
adoption of such an agreement would be economically damaging to the US economy.  As 
with DDT, the US holds a double standard of environmental responsibility, where it 
supports only those causes with no cost to itself.
Aside from the perceived double standard, many view DDT restrictions as an 
example of a western value system being unfairly forced upon developing nations (Litsios, 
1997; Packard, 1997).   Western based international organizations claim that the costs of 
DDT outweigh the benefits, but the nations that could most benefit from the anti-malarial 
use of DDT have no say in the assessment.  In fact many African nations who restarted 
DDT programs in the 1990’s were forced to stop for fear of losing their foreign public 
health funding (Tren & Bate, 2001; Rosenberg, 2004).   International organizations claim 
“environmental sustainability” as their reason for DDT related restrictions, but as Tren and 
Bate ask in their analysis of the DDT question, “sustainability for whom (Tren & Bate, 
2001, p. 61)?” The western definition of sustainability is a very narrow one.  What about 
the sustainability of nations with over 100% malaria rates whose economies, education 
systems, food production, and infrastructure development suffer from the decreased 
productivity due to malaria (Litsios, 1997; Packard, 1997; Williams, 1978; Rosenberg, 
2004)?  What about the sustainability of the one out of every twenty children in the world 
who die of malaria every year?   While the story of DDT is a sad one, it is but one example 
of the many ultimatums western nations attach to international health aid.  Western values 
color the programs of supposedly “international” organizations such as the World Health 
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Organization, UNICEF,  Oxfam, and the International Red Cross.  Be it clinging to 
abstinence as a primary control of the AIDS epidemic, or denouncing cost effective malaria 
control methods, these organizations have moved far from the Rockefeller’s region specific 
methods.  Instead they rely on a “One Plan Fits-All” approach that groups all developing 
nations in one homogenous category.  Ultimately it is a question of who should dictate the 
values for an entire region. Should it be those who have already benefitted from DDT? or 
those who can afford little else?
The final argument for DDT, supports DDT use only as a measure to gain control 
over severe epidemics.  As in the American case, this reasoning holds that the costs of 
DDT are worthwhile in order to contain a malarial outbreak.  Once the emergency stage of 
the epidemic is contained, they believe DDT use should be terminated.  This idea is based 
on the real life cases of South Africa, Mexico and Brazil where DDT was successfully used 
to stem virulent outbreaks, and then replaced by alternative methods once the infected 
population diminished (Tren & Bate, 2001). The case of South Africa is especially telling 
because it employed this policy in the late 90’s, after the WHO regulations went into place.  
The South African government intentionally forwent foreign funding, choosing instead to 
finance their own anti-malarial campaign which included limited DDT house spraying.  
Within a few years, cases dropped by 90%, and they had gained enough control over 
outbreaks to switch to a containment policy of prophylactic treatment and bed net 
distribution.  This kind of policy is especially effective with regard to malaria because the 
disease life cycle depends on a large infect population to survive.  By initially gaining 
control of the size of infected populations, the government no longer need worry about 
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eliminating the mosquito vector as strongly, and could re-instate DDT restrictions.  It is 
especially important to note that none of these nations advocated DDT use in agriculture, 
but rather limited it for use in disease control.
 It is unarguable that the costs of DDT are clear.  If use in large quantities it can 
harm birds and fish and can generally disrupt local ecosystems.  However, the issue of 
DDT represents a larger problem, the problem of human excess and its affect on the 
environment.  By using moderation we could benefit a larger number of people with little 
additional risk. Though the costs are clear, the benefits of extremely limited DDT use merit 
renewed consideration.  Moreover, it is imperative that we include the nations who suffer 
most from malarial outbreaks in this debate instead of coercing them to adhere to the 
values of other nations.  Only by embarking on this kind of collaboration can we 
encourage true environmental responsibility while still effectively addressing the plights of 
impoverished populations.
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Chapter V : Solutions For the Future 
Unlike the Rockefeller Foundation’s regionally-specific, host nation-conscious 
antimalarial campaigns, modern day health campaigns are based on western values instead 
of region specific conditions.  Additionally these campaigns are variable with the political 
climate of the time.  Nations could be showered with aid one day and completely cut off 
another day, based on their allegiances.  This non-comprehensive method of executing 
campaigns has actually exacerbated epidemics by making nations reliant on foreign aid and 
them removing it, leaving partially completed campaigns that lead to worse health 
problems, and handicapping severely affected areas by withholding necessary resources.  
By closely studying past mistakes, however, public health officials can formulate effective 
plans for the future that avoid the pitfalls of days gone by.  To effectively approach malaria 
containment today officials must: be cognizant of regional differences; build local primary 
care networks; establish education campaigns to increase the efficiency of existing 
measures; integrate host nation professionals into aid endeavors to build self -reliance; and 
institute local early detection and first attack programs to decrease the severity of 
epidemics.
Awareness of regional differences may be the most effective change that can be 
made to current anti-malarial campaigns.  Organizations like the WHO, UNICEF and 
USAID have many blanket programs that do not effectively assess the needs of individual 
regions (Tren & Bate, 2001).  For example, vector control is far more effective in Asia 
where eradication/control of mosquito populations is possible.  Africa on the other hand, 
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with its the native virulent gambiae mosquito and large endemic populations have little 
hope for solely vector based control methods. Instead it requires a more comprehensive 
method which integrates prophylactic treatment and other containment methods such as 
bed nets.  Similarly, some nations spend large amounts of money on pesticides and 
medicine with 80% failure rates because of international restrictions (Needham, 2003; 
Rosenberg, 2004).  By assessing the cost-benefit ratio of alternatives, such as the 
reintroduction of DDT, these nations could vastly improve the efficiency of their 
antimalarial initiatives.
Another important change to adopt, is a focus on the establishment of 
comprehensive primary health care networks (Packard, 1997).  As previously mentioned 
most anti-malarial campaigns have tended to focus around urban regions, where some 
health infrastructure exists. Mosquito populations are impervious to urban-rural 
boundaries, however, and this fragmentation of health campaigns leaves large portions of 
native populations untouched.  By training a few locals in these rural regions, as they did 
in the Mali case (See Ch. IV), international aid organizations as well as host governments 
can access remote areas in a cost efficient way.  This also builds the self-sufficiency of the 
host nation, while providing rural citizens with local contacts who they trust.
Education is especially important to comprehensive health initiatives.  Unlike 
health campaigns of the past, which adopted a “trustee mentality” that underplayed 
developing nations ability to help themselves, todays health campaigns have begun to 
stress the education of local populations (Tren & Bate, 2001; Needham, 2003; ECA, 2004). 
However, while education is an important part of campaigns for diseases like AIDS, it is an 
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underutilized tool in anti-malarial campaigns.  These campaigns not only have their own 
benefits, they can even increase the efficacy of existing measures (Rosenberg, 2004; 
Needham, 2003; ECA, 2004).  For example, the African Union and the WHO collaborated 
with several countries in Africa to educate local populations about proper bed net use.  By 
stressing guidelines like not going out after dark and putting children under bed nets 
immediately after dusk, these organizations were able to greatly increase the efficiency of 
bed net use.  Regarding this particular endeavor, one WHO official noted “In places where 
people are not used to sleeping under nets, it is really very hard to make that change.  Even 
if you bring the nets and make them available, you have a very intensive educational effort 
to undertake (Needham, 2003, p.36).”  By respecting the ability of local populations to 
learn and change through establishing educational campaigns, we can expand the 
efficiency of both current and future health initiatives.
Also, by integrating local officials into foreign aid initiatives, aid agencies can 
encourage self-sufficiency in nations that have long been dependent on the West for their 
public health programs.  Helping budding local health agencies become self-sufficient is 
the best way to wean developing nations away from unhealthy dependance (Needham, 
2003; Rosenberg, 2004).  For example, in Mozambique, WHO officials began training 
locals in house spraying techniques.  The government and WHO collaborate to fund 
equipment, and local health employees do the rest. Not only does this build health 
infrastructure, but it also provides employment in rural areas.  “It helps save on transport 
costs,” says a Mozambique health official, “and the fact that sprayers come from the 
community makes it a lot more credible in terms of people accepting what is done in their 
61
households (Rosenberg, 2004,  p 7).”  This kind of integrated initiative is growing, but is 
far from a being widely adopted.  By helping developing nations to help themselves, we 
can move away from the harmful cycle of dependancy that has plagued them since colonial 
times.
Finally, establishing domestic early response networks can significantly curb the 
need for extreme measures like DDT use.  The disease life cycle of  malaria is highly 
dependent on a large, infected human population, so that mosquito vectors  have a high 
chance of contamination (Williams, 1969).  By controlling infected populations with bed 
nets and selective house spraying, aid agencies can limit the prevalence of the disease at 
low cost.  Also, building infrastructure so that epidemics are reported early can lead to a 
cost effective way of distributing the necessary resources. For example, it is easier to 
administer a few doses early in an outbreak, than trying to orchestrate wide scale 
distribution during an epidemic.  By integrating these improvements, aid agencies can 
increase the effectiveness of their campaigns, therein saving millions of lives.
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Chapter VI 
 Conclusion: The Global Repercussions of Inaction 
Current malarial epidemics are a result of centuries of interacting factors including 
residual colonial and Cold War trends along with a lack of adaptability in current anti-
malarial strategies.  Today, malaria provides a compelling example of how trends in 
international public health can leave millions of people suffering from devastating 
epidemics.  After it was eradicated in the first world, support for malaria eradication 
programs became a political tool exploited by a few hegemonic powers.  As a result, 
today’s anti-malarial campaigns have become more emblematic than effective.  Through 
inattention to regional differences, a politicization of international health aid allocation, the 
persistence of unhealthy 1st-3rd world patterns of dependance, and the narrow enforcement 
of western values on developing nations, the patterns of the past continue to hamper the 
success of anti-malarial campaigns today. 
In an increasingly globalizing world, however the plight of people in distant 
communities can have profound effects on the rest of the world. The West must rekindle an 
interest in malaria for their own benefit and the benefit of citizens abroad.  For example, 
with growing immigration and travel, widespread epidemics abroad can easily spread 
throughout the world.  In the past ten years alone, cases of malaria have been found in 
California, New York, Texas, Virginia, and New Jersey (Needham, 2003).  Frighteningly, 
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many of those cases were contracted locally, not during travel.  Unless we address malaria 
abroad, we we never be free of it at home.  
Similarly, by connecting health aid to political motivations, we frequently leave 
campaigns only partially executed. These partially completed eradication campaigns can 
lead to the rise of drug resistant strains of plasmodia, which threaten the entire global 
community.  As seen in the spread of drug resistant TB, desultory health endeavors can be 
devastatingly harmful by allowing new strains to survive.  To avoid this we must remain 
consistent in our efforts.  
 Finally, the international community must also consider the consequence of 
hampered development in highly infected regions.  Malaria decreases productivity, 
education rates, infrastructure building, and many other aspects of life, central to the 
growth of developing nations.  By not addressing the issue of malaria, we are losing the 
benefits that a growing third world would bring everyone. Education and economic growth 
in particular are strongly connected to political stability.
 These are but a few of the potential consequences of inaction that illustrate the 
urgency of addressing current global malaria epidemics.  In order to help ourselves and our 
neighbors, it is imperative that the global community alter the trends that have hampered 
the adoption of effective strategies for so long.  In analyzing the historical sources of these 
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